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Monetary restraint in Poland does not operate in the expected manner under the condi-
tions of predominant state ownership of both banks and industrial enterprises.
With effective owners' control being prohibitively costly in the state-owned firms,
"nobody's" banks continue their old lending pattern to large state-owned enterprises
regardless of the latters' creditworthiness and profitability. "Nobody's" enterprises
accustomed to soft budget constraint are not deterred by high interest rate levels.
Under these circumstances macroeconomic restraint does not select the best enterprises
but in fact does the reverse: Least efficient large enterprises survive, while smaller but
more efficient ones starved of credits are threatened with bankruptcy.
Inability to cope effectively with the legacy of the Soviet-type economy is compounded
by autonomous policy errors. Apart from too nervous reactions to monthly changes in the
inflation rate, the major mistake has been the timing and scale of tightening monetary
policy. The sharp increases in the interest rate were effected almost weeks before the
major demand reduction for Polish products resulting from the expected changes in trade
with the Soviet Union. As a result the economy received a strong recessionary blow from
monetary policy that preceded another major blow from the fall in foreign demand. Inevi-
tably the economy went into a recession that did not end by June 1991 while inflation
continued.
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When the present writer assessed the Polish transition programme at mid-1990 [see
Winiecki, 1990a], the assessment was on balance highly positive with respect to
stabilisation. Near-hyperinflation disappeared (and this happened in spite of far-
reaching price liberalisation), the large budget deficit disappeared as well, and
there was a fast growing surplus in foreign trade. The price paid for this was a
sharp fall in output and rising unemployment, although at a much slower rate.
I pointed out, however, that a large part of that output was in fact system-
specific waste that disappeared at the early stage of the transition to a market
economy. Its disappearance signified in reality the decline in the use of inputs per
unit of output, i. e. economic gain trough higher efficiency, rather than economic
loss [see Winiecki, 1990a; 1990b; 1991d]. Thus, real costs were lower than statisti-
cal ones.
Now, a year later, the transition, and even its stabilisation part, is assessed
in strikingly different terms. At the one end of the spectrum, especially within the
country, it is seen as an unmitigated disaster; at the other end, optimists, who
are few and far between, see nothing wrong with the stabilisation programme as
such and ascribe mounting problems only to the deterioration in external environ-
ment. This is the view of the Polish government's macroeconomic team, of inter-
national institutions and some Western experts and journalists (apart from govern-
ment's pronouncements; see, for example, a report from the meeting with a
high-ranking IMF official, Mr. Richard Erb, Zycie Gospodarcze, 1991, No. 20, or
Gomulka [1991], or Martin Wolf in Financial Times, May 3, 1991, or Business
Week's special report, April 11, 1991).
This author is situated somewhere in the middle. He regards the stabilisation
programme as by and large sound in its principles but on the verge of an ex-
tremely costly failure. This looming failure is the product of accumulating effects
of policy errors and transplantation of policy instruments without regard for the
different institutional environment of the post-Soviet-type economy (post-STE) in
which these instruments operate. Applications of these policy instruments often
bring about perverse effects. As things get worse rather than better, the whole
programme comes under threat.II. Mid-1990 to Mid-1991: On a Keynesian Roller-Coaster
The basically positive assessment at mid-1990 could not, or at the very least
should not, put aside some worrying and/or puzzling aspects of the situation.
First, inflation did not disappear but, since March 1990, stabilised within a 3-5
per cent per month range. This in itself was not unusual: post-hyperinflation
recovery has often been accompanied by "inertial" inflation [see, e.g., Dornbusch
et al., 1990; Bernholz, 1990]. However, over the next year it did not decline. In
the second quarter of 1991 it was about the same as it had been in the second
quarter of 1990.
More worryingly, inflation continued in spite of the surprisingly large budget
surplus in mid-1990, as well as the steep fall in real wages. The traditional in-
flation-boosting phenomena were, thus, absent in the Polish economy at mid-1990.
Next, output recovery was not forthcoming and this was definitely more puzzling.
Although part of the output fall could be seen as an adjustment to a more efficient
economic system, the recovery was barely noticeable in the second quarter of 1990.
Furthermore, nobody expected a fall of such magnitude (whether adjustment to a
more efficient system was taken into account or not).
Last but not least, a steep fall in real wages (even if overstated by statis-
tics) should have been expected to give rise to wage claims aimed at recovering a
part of the lost purchasing power. Wage controls implied that these claims would
politicise the wage conflict since they shifted claims from enterprise to government
level.
Under such circumstances some macroeconomic policy .change had to be expec-
ted, accompanied by other measures correcting effects of the legacy of Soviet-type
economy (STE) on the transition process. The latter measures were all the more
necessary as state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were not adjusting to new conditions
as rapidly as expected. In some respects adjustment was not only slow but also
perverse. This happened in spite of the perceived restrictive macroeconomic policy
framework - this was at least a near-consensus view [ see, however, Winiecki,
1990a].
Not unexpectedly then, the summer of 1990 brought about some macroeconomic
policy change. The central bank (NBP) reduced further the interest rate (and
shifted it from a monthly to an annual basis) to 34 per cent per annum for refi-
nancing loans for commercial banks (the central bank's basic lending rate). This
amounted to a decrease from 4 to 2.5 per cent on a monthly basis, probably too
large a decrease considering the monthly inflation rate in the second quarter.Fiscal policy was slightly less restrictive but in a wrong way. Deferments of
tax payment were accepted when applied for. "Reinterpretation" of application of
indexation rules created greater room for wage increases, too. However, an alter-
native of gradual reduction of budget surplus and elimination of wage controls
were, in my opinion, a sounder way of reducing a degree of macroeconomic re-
straint.
The foregoing had some macroeconomic effects. Industrial output that stag-
nated from March till May picked up already in June (4.9 per cent on a month-to-
month basis) and continued by and large uninterruptedly till September 1990 at a
rather elevated pace, a 12.2 per cent dip in the vacation month of July notwith-
standing. However, output was again flat in October. The price pattern did not
change, though. Inflation continued within a 3-5 per cent per month range. The
best month was certainly August 1990, when industrial output grew by 7.6 per
cent over the preceding month (although after the traditional July output dip),
while the consumer price index (CPI) increased by 1. 8 per cent only. The inflation
abatement turned out to be one month's departure from the range observed since
March, though, and the CPI growth rate moved back to its earlier range (4.6 per
cent in September).
This obviously unnerved the macroeconomic team of the government and
influenced the decision of the central bank. The central bank increased its basic
lending rate from 34 to 43 per cent on an annual basis in October (3 per cent per
month), which might have been closer to the needed one in the face of continuing
inflation at the 3-5 per cent month rate. But the October inflation rate did not
show any decline and the central bank raised its basic rate again in November to
55 per cent (3.7 per cent per month). This overhasty, nervous reaction to month-
ly changes in basic indicators that might have been influenced by random or
seasonal phenomena had momentous consequences. Since October 1990 the output
rate has been strongly under the influence of the rising cost of money. Output
and inflation data are shown in Table 1.
It is, of course, possible that the government had hoped for a continuing -
quarter by quarter - decline in inflation and took the August CPI growth rate as
supporting its expectations and the September price jump not as a return to an
underlying inflation rate but as a signal of renewed inflationary pressures. Po-
licy-makers acted, however, without much reflection on the real meaning of a
one-month dip in the inflation rate, which did not justify so far-reaching con-
clusions. (Actually, they acted also without much regard for the easily predictable
consequences of deteriorating external environment for the Polish economy and the6










































Source: Biuletyn Statystyczny GUS (monthly); Iriformacja o Sytuacji Spoleczno-
Gospodarczej Kraju, GUS (monthly); Informacja o Sytuacji Gospodarczej,
CUP (monthly & quarterly).
interaction of sharp interest rate increases with these consequences; see Section
IV on "autonomous" policy errors).
Besides, all these policy measures were taken in the overheated atmosphere of
forthcoming presidential elections. Both earlier loosening and later tightening of
macroeconomic policy were surrounded by an almost surrealist rhetoric. Government
tried to present itself as a model of monetary and fiscal rectitude and declared its
adherence to macroeconomic restraint in blatant contrast with the actual policy
stance in the July-September 1990 period.
Monetary policy was loosened in summer and then tightened sharply in Octo-
ber and November. Fiscal policy, in turn, continued its restrictive stance for most
of the year and only in the last month the government tried feverishly to reduce
the budget surplus (quite probably fuelling inflation in this way, as the speed of
change is an important factor in creating inflationary pressure). Changes in the
budgetary balance are shown in Table 2. All these shifts have been accompanied
by firm declarations of an unchanged macroeconomic policy course. It is not clear
whether such stance benefited the then prime minister who competed for the Polish
presidency with Lech Walesa.
The inflation rate continued to be within a 3-5 per cent per month range
























































- (b) Postponed ex-
30 billion zlotys.
Source: See Table 1.
flationary pressures although there was no difference between the second and
fourth quarter and very little difference between the third and fourth quarter
(whatever difference there was, it stemmed from a one-month dip in the inflation
rate in August). Nonetheless, the macroeconomic team took all this very seriously
and designed for 1991 the policy package that was far more restrictive than envis-
aged a few months earlier.
Apart from a sharply higher interest rate (to be raised still further in Jan-
uary), the package attempted to reduce the level of budgetary expenditures in
real terms in 1991 and tightened wage controls. It is not certain what was the role
envisaged in this package for the exchange rate. Fixed in January 1990 - original-
ly for three months - it continued to be fixed vis-a-vis the US$ throughout the
year and policy-makers showed no intention to change it in any way. Whether it
was seen as an instrument of pressure on SOEs to adjust under competitive pres-
sure from abroad or as part of the anti-inflationary package for 1991 is a mystery
for the present writer. Whatever the intention, effects were perverse rather than
the expected ones.
Another mystery for the present writer are the government's growth projec-
tions for 1991 prepared at about the same time (autumn 1990). GDP growth of 4
per cent per annum in 1991 was under the circumstances completely unrealistic.
Growing demand for goods and services has to come from somewhere. However, nodemand component looked promising for 1991, given the prepared policy package
and - let us add - the external environment for the Polish economy.
Private consumption was to remain restrained since government planned more
restrictive wage controls for the state sector (still more than 3/4 of employment).
The abolition of wage controls in the private sector was of limited help in this
respect. Public consumption was not expected to give additional stimulus as an
attempt was made to reduce the level of budget expenditures in real terms. Invest-
ment was not very likely to give much boost to economic growth either, after the
sharp rise in the interest rate. Interestingly, government projected a 20 per cent
growth of investments in real terms for 1991.
Last but certainly not least, foreign demand did not look promising at all.
The sharp rise in oil prices accentuated the cyclical slowdown in the West, re-
ducing export prospects in this direction. The loss of Iraqi and Kuwaiti markets
also mattered. Worst of all, the change to convertible currency trade with the
USSR and other ex-COMECON countries was widely expected to lead to a steep fall
in exports (many expected eastbound exports to be cut by half).
On top of exogenous factors reducing demand for Polish exports, the ex-
change rate policy of the central bank weakened these prospects even further as
the exchange rate was maintained throughout 1990 in the face of a CPI increase of
249.3 per cent (and a quasi-WPI increase of 191.5 per cent on a December 1989-
December 1990 basis). Although the devaluation at the end of December 1989 was
substantial enough to compensate for the expected price increase after liberal-
isation in January 1990, it has not been sufficient to compensate the 60 per cent
loss of purchasing power of the US$ vis-a-vis the zloty by the end of 1990.
At this point there were no components of final demand that warranted the
optimism displayed by the government's macroeconomic team. Even the expected
buoyancy of the private sector was under threat of being throttled by very high
interest rates. The optimism of the team went beyond the growth projections and
extended to the composition of the budget based often on unrealistic expectations
with respect to budgetary receipts.
Reality usually differs from carefully (and even more from carelessly) de-
signed programmes and this has been the case also this time. The election of
Walesa to the presidency resulted in a government shake-up. The macroeconomic
team, however, remained in place in order to signal foreign creditors and inter-
national institutions the willingness of the new government to continue the transi-
tion programme with all its fundamental features. Nonetheless, some correctionshad to be made to fulfil at least some of the promises made during the presidential
campaign.
Budget expenditures increased and so did receipts (albeit to a much lesser
extent). A small deficit was projected but even this did not satisfy various gov-
ernment critics. As a result, the budget was not formally accepted by parliament
well into 1991. Given the government's optimism with respect to receipts, a sub-
stantially larger deficit might have been expected.
Expansion of budget expenditures apart, all other demand components sug-
gested stagnation if not actual contraction of output in 1991. Industrial output
stagnated after October 1990 (a small growth in December, a month usually charac-
terised by much larger output increases everywhere, does not contradict this
view) and then slid precipitously by 17.6 per cent in January 1991 with further
declines in the March-May period.
Thus, Poland became the only one among post-STEs that underwent a second
(in the author's view policy-induced) recession. The shape of the output curve in
Figure 1 shows that clearly enough. In Hungary and Czechoslovakia the primary,
corrective recession continued for the third and second year respectively, as these
countries opted for a less drastic stabilisation package. In Poland the primary
corrective recession that was expected to change the demand/ supply relationship
and wring out hyperinflation was sharper but ended earlier. Output started inch-
ing upward from June 1990. It stagnated, however, toward the end of 1990 and
began declining again from January 1991 under the impact of a sharp increase in
the central bank's basic lending rate (increased again in January 1991 to 72 per
cent on annual and 4.6 per cent on a monthly basis) combined with bank-by-bank
credit rationing. Thus, the seeds of recession were visible already in the autumn
of 1990 before the impact of the drastic fall in exports to the USSR and other ex-
COMECON countries began to be felt. It is for that reason that the author calls
the recession policy-induced. Within the framework of this policy the May 1991
moderate correction of the interest rate and the exchange rate were seen by many
as too little too late.
At mid-1991 the picture is not very encouraging. The recession has not yet
bottomed out. Inflation continues within a 3-5 per cent range, with outliers
scattered here and there (in 1991 the highest in January due to large increases in
This is, nota bene, what the present writer warned about in a letter to the
presidential chancery in December 1990, later circulated privately in mimeo form
[Winiecki, 1990c]. Macroeconomic developments in the first half of 1991 proved
me right.10
Figure 1 - Industrial Output: Raw and Smoothed Time Series for January 1990-May
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Source: Informacja o sytuacji gospodarczej, CUP, June 1991, mimeo.
regulated energy prices and lowest in April). The foregoing suggests the existence
of the underlying inflation rate almost independent of the level of the interest rate
and the exchange rate, that is of the cost of money and of competitive pressures.
Attempts to throttle this type of inflation through orthodox monetary and other
macroeconomic measures were evidently unsuccessful.
This suggests that other measures are also needed to achieve this end.
Nonetheless the idea remained foreign to the government's macroeconomic team.
Supported by other, mostly foreign experts, who did not have any earlier expe-
rience with the STE and its possible impact upon transition, they persisted in the
conviction of being right on course. However, perverse effects of such policies
were clear to some other members of the government. For example the Minister for
Industry stressed that the best enterprises are on the verge of bankruptcy, while
the worst ones survive without much effort [Zycie Gospodarcze, 1991, No. 18].
Until the end of the period under consideration there were no bankruptcies,
although already by the end of January 1991 more than 500 SOEs lost creditworthi-
ness (their number almost doubled since then). However, no bank-initiated bank-
ruptcy proceedings against SOEs to collect the debt have taken place. Nor were
they initiated by one SOE against another. Quite obviously, the microeconomic
sphere of state-owned banks and state-owned industrial enterprises has behaved
differently than expected. Worth noticing has also been the fact that among SOEs
which lost their credit worthiness, there were no large enterprises. Since the latter
have historically been least efficient under the STE system, the foregoing pheno-11
menon suggested that other forces were at work than the selection mechanism of
macroeconomic restraint assumed to eliminate least efficient producers.
Thus, relatively better (rather than worse) SOEs came increasingly under the
threat of bankruptcy. In a parallel development SOEs have been increasingly in
arrears with respect to taxes. By the end of April 1991 already 2700 SOEs owed
9.8 billion zlotys in unpaid taxes, i.e. more by a third than the size of the budget
deficit at that time. Again, arrears did not decline since April. Thus, yet another
success of mid-1990 came under threat, i.e. a balanced budget (in mid-May 1991
the Central Planning Board did not rule out the possibility that the budget deficit
would reach 26 billion zlotys, that is 3-4 per cent of the projected GDP [Gazeta
Bankowa, 1991, No. 21]. Little was left of the highly positive tone of the mid-1990
assessment. A question that needs answering is: What went wrong?
III. Microeconomic Foundations of Macroeconomic Failure
The failure has its roots in the interaction between microeconomic and macroeco-
nomic spheres whose outcomes belie expectations of policy-makers (and their ad-
visers) about the behaviour of economic agents under policies pursued through
orthodox "Keynesian" measures: manipulation of the interest rate, taxes and bud-
get, while maintaining a fixed exchange rate and, additionally, stiff wage controls.
In an atypical world of post-STEs such as Poland, these measures do not
necessarily yield results expected under the market system with a dominant private
ownership. In this respect, post-STEs with their near exclusive non-private own-
ership - especially among larger firms - differ not only from well-functioning
market economies of the West but also from distorted market economies of Asia or
Latin America [see Winiecki, 1991b].
1. Macro-to-Micro: Too Weak Pressure on SOEs to Adjust throughout 1990
Private enterprises facing falling demand generally try to cut costs, launch new
products, seek new channels of distribution, new markets, etc. SOEs in a post-
STE such as Poland have, however, property rights assigned in a way that in-
creases enormously transaction costs, as there is almost no owners" control over
the management. Therefore, adjustment to falling demand may be different there.12
There has been an almost uniform opinion that SOEs did not adjust rapidly
enough and, moreover, in some respects their adjustment has been perverse.
Although some adjustment did take place (reduction of inventories, search for
alternative distribution channels domestically and, significantly, shift of a larger
share of output to foreign markets), passive adjustment through reduction in
output combined with furloughirig (more rarely laying off) the labour force has
been dominant. Attempts at raising prices were also more numerous than those
aimed at cost cutting.
However, an important issue has not really been explored, namely to what
extent SOEs were forced to adjust. The present writer already stressed the point
earlier [Winiecki, 1990a], insisting that SOEs were not strongly pressured in the
first half of 1990, i.e. the period that due to both high nominal (and later also
real) interest rates and deep cuts in subsidies has been widely regarded as one of
severe restriction. He pointed out that although households were severely
squeezed, SOEs - in contrast - were not. Fast growth of SOEs' deposits in real
terms suggests a relatively good and improving liquidity position throughout the
period (Table 3).
Table 3 - Households' and SOEs' Deposits in National Currency, July 1990-June









































































































(a) Deflated by CPI. - (b) Deflated by quasi-WPI. - (c) First month in which
households* deposits exceeded the already very low December 1989 level.
Source: See Table 1.Blblfofhek
des Instituts fur Welfwirtschafi
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This good position did not result from credit expansion (credits to domestic
economic agents fell between December 1989 and June 1990 by some 20 per cent in
real terms). But SOEs found other sources of financial support to survive the
macroeconomic squeeze. Firstly, their input inventories (generally much larger
relative to output than those in Western enterprises) increased still further in 1989
as near-hyper inflation created additional incentives in this respect. In conse-
quence, input inventories in industry increased by 20 per cent (!)., with the
purchase fuelled by ever cheaper money (as interest rates were not raised to even
near real positive levels in the face of fast price increases). The same applied to
imported inputs (since the exchange rate was not raised sufficiently to make up
for very much faster domestic price increases). Altogether, cheaply bought inputs
used in highly priced outputs after the price liberalisation in January 1990 ensured
high profitability even at low capacity utilisation rates.
There was yet another source of liquidity, namely the stock of convertible
currencies accumulated by enterprises under the export earnings retention scheme.
Since the right of enterprises to keep foreign exchange accounts was abolished
under the transition programme, SOEs drew this stock down rapidly, reducing it
by 60 per cent between December 1989 and June 1990 (i.e. by US$ 1.7 billion).
Although the consequences of the foreign exchange regime change in this respect
were not difficult to predict, no attempt was made by the government to neutralise
at least part of the expected money inflow.
And, lastly, as the shift to exports gathered pace, while imports were
trailing behind, the trade surplus became another, more lasting source of liquidity
for exporting enterprises. Whatever the sources, monetary constraint on SOEs in
the January-June 1990 period has not been as strong as is generally claimed. What
is worth stressing here, though, it is the fact that tightening macroeconomic policy
required also measures other than interest rate changes (such as neutralisation of
domestic currency effects of abolished foreign exchange accounts).
One could have expected that later in the year, as stocks of cheaply bought
inputs and accumulated convertible currencies declined markedly, the degree of
pressure to adjust would increase. As stressed in the preceding section, however,
the interest rate was reduced and credit expansion accelerated in the summer of
1990 (see Table 4). The pressure to adjust decreased in fact. Consequently,
macroeconomic policy influenced the microeconomic adjustment of the state enter-
prise sector the wrong way.14








































Source: Biuletyn Statystyczny GUS (monthly); Narodowy Bank Polski: I Kwartal -
Ocena Wstepna (quarterly).
2. Micro-to-Micro: Interaction of "Nobody's" Banks and "Nobody's" Industrial Firms
Under normal, "textbook" conditions there is no other way of wringing out infla-
tion from the economy than a gradual or sharp tightening of monetary policy
(Keynesians who advise Polish policy-makers add to the above also wage controls).
However, under the far from normal conditions of a post-STE, manipulation of the
interest rate may be a necessary but not sufficient condition to achieve this goal.
What is missing among policy-makers and their advisers is the realisation that
state-owned banks and state-owned industrial firms do not behave the way their
private counterparts in a market economy do.
Since costs of control are extremely high in the case of an abstract owner,
i.e. the state [see, e.g., Furubotn, Pejovich, 1972; Jensen, Meckling, 1976;
Demsetz, 1980], state-owned commercial banks do not look at their clients the way
privately owned banks do in the West. Historically, they have always been lending
first of all to large SOEs and - partly prodded by inertia - they continue to do so
under the changed regime.
Banks owned by "nobody" are run by bureaucrats who rarely know what
prudent lending policy is about and even if they do they rarely care. The credit-
worthiness of their clients is not a matter of serious concern to them. Although
they compile at the request of the central bank the list of enterprises that lost15
creditworthiness, they do not draw conclusions from the fact. A study by the
central bank [see Informacja NBP, 1991] reveals that by the end of January 1991
there had been no case where a commercial bank initiated bankruptcy proceedings
against its debtor. About half of the enterprises concerned were on the list of
uncreditworthy ones for about half a year and no bankruptcy took place. Obvious-
ly, either these enterprises could do without credit or obtained it regardless of
their lack of creditworthiness.
Lending inertia is matched by borrowing inertia. "Nobody's" enterprises are
not concerned to the same extent as private enterprises by ballooning debt-to-
equity ratio. In fact, a question posed that way would be greeted in many SOEs
with incomprehension: they are unaccustomed to think in those terms. As long as
there is money to pay wages, things do not look too bad. And many SOEs borrow
exactly for that purpose. Trade unions, self-management bodies and employees all
are steeped in the past and many still think that somebody owes workers undeman-
ding work pace and low but secure wages. There are no owners ready to inter-
vene, shake up the management and try to save the firm. Nobody speaks in the
name of capital. The ghost of bankruptcy is still for most enterprises exactly that
- a ghost. When things get really bad and a consensus emerges that something
should be done it is usually too late.
Not only inertia carries over old patterns of behaviour but also political
economy of transition. Old nomenklatura linkages that generated "soft" budget
constraint under the STE regime still exist here and there but, worse still, new
political linkages affect monetary policy in the same manner. Linkages between
enterprise managers, communist party apparatus and banks or ministries [see e.g.
Winiecki, 1989; 1991a] have been largely superseded by those between self-manage-
ment bodies and "Solidarity" enterprise level union organisations, "Solidarity"
regional federations and friendly local officials and parliamentarians who try to
influence banks and ministries so that they come to the rescue. Since state banks'
managers are still de facto appointed by bureaucrats, not by bank private share-
holders, they are sensitive to outside pressure. In this manner "soft" budget
constraint has been resurrected in the transition process.
Just as in the not so distant past, there is a very specific pattern of le-
niency in lending. It is the biggest SOEs, possessing the strongest political clout,
that encounter no problems in borrowing. Interestingly, on the list of 523 enter-
prises that lost their creditworthiness by the end ofr January 1991 there was no
large enterprise. Therefore, although it is nobody's secret that historically they
were least efficient among SOEs, they are still regarded as creditworthy.16
And in a paradoxical way they are, because they believe that if the worst
comes to the worst, the state will bail them out. This assumption was even articu-
lated expressis verbis by a left-leaning "Solidarity" leader, Bujak, who said, while
referring to a difficult situation of the large tractoi—producing enterprise "Ursus"
that it is too big a firm to simply go bankrupt [ quoted in Gazeta Wyborcza, Febru-
ary 19, 1991]. Many do not say so but act on the basis of the same premise. No
level of interest rate is high enough to deter them from borrowing. The conse-
quences of such a pattern of behaviour of state-owned banks and enterprises are
highly damaging in the transition to a market economy.
3. Micro-to-Macro: Perverse Effects of Interest Rate Manipulation under Different
Ownership Structure
Since January 1990 monetary policy in Poland has been pursued mainly through
the manipulation of the interest rate (plus changes in the reserve ratio and, less
fashionably, credit ceilings for individual large, state-owned commercial banks).
However, the use of the interest rate is not a very efficient anti-inflationary and,
conversely, stimulatory measure, where ownership structure differs radically from
that of a capitalist market economy. Five quarters (from the second quarter of
1990 to the second quarter of 1991) of persistent inflation at a basically unchanged
monthly rate ranging between 3 and 5 per cent should be regarded as sufficiently
convincing in this respect.
In reality, the impact of interest rate manipulation on persistent inflation is
not only weak but to a large extent perverse, i. e. its outcomes are opposite to
those intended by policy-makers. The assumption, e.g. behind restrictive monetary
policy, is that the higher cost of money will lead to a positive natural selection of
enterprises and projects, with those more profitable expanding or surviving and
less profitable ones contracting or exiting from the market. In the light of what I
wrote in the preceding sub-section, this assumption is clearly wrong for a post-
STE such as Poland. Let us outline the sequence of events under monetary policy
applied in a manner described above. In reality, it will be a re-run of Poland's
monetary policy between September 1990 and May 1991.
Policy-makers interpret a rise in the monthly inflation rate not as a variation
within a range it displayed in the recent past but as an upward shift in the
inflation rate. The Keynesian reaction is to raise the interest rate. Impatience,
coupled with belief in quick results of such a manipulation, makes them repeat the17
move again if the inflation rate does not decline almost instantaneously. Thus, in
Poland the central bank's basic lending rate was raised twice from 34 to 43 per
cent, and later to 54 per cent, - all within a two-months period.
The credit squeeze is beginning to bite. But is it biting whom it should? The
answer is - no. Inertial lending plus political clout result in a situation where the
largest and generally least efficient SOEs will generally obtain the credit volume
they ask for anyway. But other, smaller and relatively more efficient SOEs will get
less. Firstly, they borrow somewhat more prudently and are often deterred by
very high interest rates. And, secondly, if there are credit ceilings on a per bank
basis, the shrinking credit pie affects them in the first place. Thus, it is the rel-
atively better SOEs that are adversely affected by an interest rate increase. As
they face mounting difficulties and sometimes totter on the face of bankruptcy, the
output structure gets worse rather than better. Private enterprises are also ad-
versely affected. Although a share of credits set aside for the private sector
protects them against being crowded out, nothing protects them against the high
price they have to pay for borrowed money. Since few projects can be so profit-
able, output expansion slows down or even declines in the private sector as well.
The output structure in the whole economy gets worse still (quite apart from the
stagnating output level).
But inflation continues within the same range as before (see Table 1). This is
not surprising for the present writer. Large SOEs, immune to the threat of bank-
ruptcy, will continue to raise prices. Some of them enjoy a monopolistic position
unaffected as yet by external competition, some others are not much afraid of the
fall in demand resulting from price increases (after all, the shortfall in the cash
flow will be made up by new credits. . . ).
Without more competition, changes in the ownership structure and attempts at
hardening "soft" budget constraint, there will be little improvement. But in the
Polish case this is not the philosophy of the government's macroeconomic team, its
advisers and - let us add - the IMF in the background. The reaction is usually
"more of the same". Inflation continues (in Poland increases, as government raised
controlled energy prices in January 1991, and policy-makers decided to raise the
interest rate again to 72 per cent on an annual basis). The results? Adverse
selection of borrowers continues. Output structure gets worse still. Economic
activity is even more severely hit. A push turns into a shove. Stagnation turns
into decline.
This is the picture of the Polish economy in the September 1990-May 1991
period. The outcome is continuing inflation and a shrinking economy. Within a18
shrinking economy the output share of the worst performers increases rather than
decreases. Results are exactly opposite to those expected under textbook condi-
tions of a different ownership structure.
The question may be raised whether the opposite direction of monetary policy
brings about as perverse results as monetary restriction. On theoretical grounds
one may expect somewhat less adverse effects. Assuming that the volume of credit
for those large SOEs with strong political clout is by and large fixed (in real
terms), relaxation of monetary policy is expected to increase the volume of credit
for relatively more efficient smaller SOEs and for private firms due to lower inter-
est rates and (wherever applicable) higher credit ceilings. Output will increase
and its structure will improve to some extent.
This is, on practical grounds, what has happened in Poland in the summer of
1990. As the level of economic activity began inching upward after the sharp fall
in January/February 1990, stimulative monetary policy (maybe too stimulative, see
the preceding section) raised the output growth rate. Industrial output increased
in August and September by impressive 7.6 per cent and 8 per cent on a month-
to-month basis. No doubt, part of it was an increase in output by protected large
monopolists. But in tandem with this adverse outcome better performers increased
their output rate - and their share in total output. Not only did the output level
get higher (a rather normal consequence of macroeconomic stimulation), but the
output structure improved, too. Inflation, however, continued as it did under a
more restrictive policy. Obvious recommendations here seem to be a less hasty
manipulation of the interest rate, smoother changes (if necessary) and - most
importantly - the application of some specific measures addressing the problem of
linkages between "nobody's" banks and "nobody's" enterprises.
For quite apart from a critical view of overhasty reactions to short-run
changes in the inflation rate, a more fundamental critique should be raised against
the government's philosophy of monetary policy. Throughout the period under
consideration there has been little understanding of the increasingly obvious fact
that orthodox monetary measures, such as manipulation of the interest rate, may
be necessary but not sufficient to cope with persistent inflation under an owner-
ship structure different from that found in macroeconomics textbooks.
The first-best solution to the problem of perverse behaviour of "nobody's"
banks and "nobody's" industrial enterprises is, of course, privatisation, especially
that of banks. As this solution needs more time than has been originally expected
(apart from mistakes in privatisation strategy and tactics made by the government,
see Beksiak and Winiecki [1990]; Gruszecki and Winiecki [1991]), some second-best19
solutions are called for. The author has the following "philosophy of intervention".
Reasonably well-functioning markets do not require intervention (search for the
Pareto-optimum, unattainable in real-life conditions, does more harm than good).
Where markets do not function reasonably well, an intervention vis-a-vis a class of
economic agents is preferable to that against specific economic agents [ see also
Williamson, 1985; 1988]. The worst thing that may happen to an economy is
"hands-on" management by policy-makers that sooner or later dissolves into an
"everything-is-bargainable" type of economy. For Poland it would be a return to
the dreaded past of the STE.
Therefore the author suggested [Winiecki, 1991c] for one class of economic
agents, that is industrial SOEs, that commercial banks should be ordered to make
a compulsory analysis of industrial SOE's cash flow, combined with that of SOEe'
mutual indebtment. For it should be remembered that one way to survive has been
for SOEs not to pay their suppliers: and since suppliers had few other clients
they have been reluctant to start bankruptcy proceedings. Banks' analyses would
reveal which SOEs generate a positive cash flow and - in the case of owing more
than being owed - whether a net cash flow would be high enough to pay the bills
in a reasonable time span.
This is what commercial banks should have been doing all along, but for
reasons explained in the preceding sub-section they do not. Therefore, the central
bank's guidance should force the banks to make such simplified analyses of their
clients viability and, on the same basis, automatically refuse further lending to
SOEs that generate a negative cash flow or to those whose cash flow is lower than
the negative balance of mutual indebtedment. Or some alternative measures could
be applied, e.g. buying a debt of that sort by the central bank, as suggested in
a discussion by Aleksander Jedraszczyk, or even abolition of all debt of SOEs
vis-a-vis state banks and other SOEs (as suggested by Steinherr, Per6e [1991]).
The stress on automacity of bank behaviour has obvious causes. It should
help to avoid political pressure on commercial banks and resultant degradation of a
proposed measure into yet another way of "hands-on" management. There will
certainly be some casualties of the automacity but the lack of it would be certainly
much costlier. There are, as stressed above, other unorthodox measures that could
make orthodox monetary policy work better (at a minimum - in a non-perverse
way). On these second-best measures hinges the possibility of success of a mone-
tary policy that at present seriously endangers the whole stabilisation programme.20
IV. "Autonomous" Macroeconomic Policy Errors
Apart from problems resulting from weak understanding of the interaction between
state-owned banks and industrial enterprises, as well as its consequences for
macroeconomic balance, macroeconomic policy has suffered from "autonomous" police
errors. By the latter I understand policy errors unrelated to micro-macro linkages
analysed in the preceding section. The first, most striking (although not necessa-
rily most fateful) have been interventionist "itchings" at the macro level. The
tendency to react to each and every change in macroeconomic (in particular infla-
tion) indicators, accentuated rather than smoothed the transition from near-hyper-
inflation-cum-stagnation, to falling inflation-cum-recession, to price stability-
cum-recovery.
Nervous, overhasty decisions, particularly on monetary policy matters, re-
sulted first in accelerated recovery and later stagnation and decline. The Polish
economy went through a full cycle from recovery to recession in less than a year.
Apart from adjustment costs in terms of the shift from old STE-type pattern of
behaviour to a market-type behaviour, enterprises had additionally to incur costs
of adjustment to the changing cyclical situation of the economy. In the stylised
pattern of the business cycle these adjustments pay back over the time span of the
(stylised) cycle. Within the framework of a cycle measured in terms of months
rather than years only costs are incurred. Some part of the problems Polish SOEs
encounter presently undoubtedly stems from extra costs incurred as a result of
this "compressed" cycle.
What is of analytical interest here is the extremely strong correlation between
changes in the monetary policy stance and output changes. Furthermore, the lag
between the former and the latter is markedly shorter (and also seems less vari-
able) than asserted by monetary theory. A look at Table 5 where interest rate
changes are set against industrial output changes lagged by just one month reveal
a marked correlation between the two variables.
If this correlation were more than an ephemeral phenomenon, a whole range of
questions should be raised. The first is, of course, one about the sources of such
unusual sensitivity to changes in monetary policy. There is little theoretical and
empirical groundwork in this respect (quite unsurprisingly, given the short time
span of the transition), so that it is only informed guesses that can be offered
here on the basis of knowledge of the traditional STE.
Enterprises in an STE, whether an orthodox Stalinist one or a "reformed"
Hungarian or Polish type, were extremely wasteful. Their inventories were gener-21









































































Source: See Table 4.
ally very much higher than those of their privately owned counterparts in the
West. They used much more materials per unit of output (and per one dollar of
GDP). But they were always much more strongly controlled with respect to posses-
sion and use of monetary balances. This was the case quite apart from inadvis-
ability of keeping any larger part of their current assets in the form of cash or
demand deposits in a shortage-plagued economy.
The author's hypothesis is that at the beginning of the transition process
SOEs in Poland found themselves short of money under the changed supply/demand
conditions and resultant requests for prompt payments for the deliveries. In the
mature Western market economy a sudden increase in demand for monetary require-
ments would be met either by the sale of less liquid assets of the firm (various
instruments of the money market such as treasury bonds, large certificates of
deposit, etc. ) or by short-term credit.
Since enterprises in an STE did not have (and were not allowed to have) the
former, they had to depend on the latter. However, the latter became extremely
costly with the beginning of the transition programme - and macroeconomic re-
straint. True, they have found some other sources of financing for the time being22
(see the first section) but the overall, so to say, "level of monetisation" of Polish
enterprises remained rather low relative to their Western counterparts. There are
certain standard measures in analysing the financial structure at the enterprise
and/or industry level (see, e.g., Rybczynski [1982], in analysing the structural
change in British industry), but they cannot be used in direct comparisons due to
the existence of various distorting factors and incomplete data on SOEs' financial
situation. Thus, the foregoing cannot be easily empirically proven. Nonetheless, I
think that part of the problems of industrial SOEs stems from their unusually high
sensitivity to interest rate changes.
The second "autonomous" policy error of the government concerns the timing
of the second round of restrictive macroeconomic policy. Apart from nervous
reactions to monthly changes in the inflation rate, the decision to drastically
tighten monetary policy through sharp rises in the interest rate in October and
November 1990 had momentuous consequences. In fact it is this decision that
pushed the Polish economy into the second recession in the autumn of 1990.
In the preceding section I criticised the rationale for this decision. What I see
as a major "autonomous" policy error is the timing of this decision. For let us
assume for the sake of argument that the government was right in seeing the
September 1990 increase in inflation vis-a-vis that of August 1990 as a sign of
rekindled inflation and not as a return to the underlying inflation rate registered
since March 1990. Was it right, under the circumstances, to raise the central
bank's basic lending rate from 34 to 54 per cent on an annual basis just at that
time, i. e. in October and November?
My answer is an unequivocal no. The government, just as everybody else
conscious of the changes in our trading relations with the Soviet Union and other
ex-COMECON countries, knew at that time that the change from the transferable
rouble to convertible currency trade would dramatically reduce our eastbound
exports. Many talked at that time about halving our exports in this direction.
Now, exports in 1989 amounted to 16.5 per cent of GDP (measured according
to SNA) and exports to COMECON countries to 5.8 per cent of GDP. In 1990
exports increased while GDP fell according to preliminary estimates by 12 per cent.
Thus, the share of exports, including that of eastbound exports increased as well.
Therefore it could easily be estimated that a halving of our eastbound exports in
1991 would create a strong recessionary impulse amounting to about 4-5 per cent of
GDP. With a severe recession looming over the economy and expected to exert its
influence already in January 1991, the sharp rise in the interest rate amounted to
an overkill. The economy halted in October (possibly for seasonal reasons), but23
more ominuously remained flat throughout the rest of the year under the impact of
tightened monetary policy.
When the recessionary impulse from falling foreign demand came in January,
the economy fell over the precipice: industrial output declined by 18. 3 per cent in
one month. Yet another increase in the central bank's basic lending rate in late
January "ensured" that the recession would continue - and it did (or does, as the
bottom of recession has not been reached at the time of writing, i.e. in June
1991). I regard the apparent inability of the macroeconomic team to correlate
determinants of the macroeconomic situation at the turn of 1990 and 1991 as the
biggest - and at the same time most easily avoidable - macroeconomic policy error.
In the same category of "autonomous" policy errors the present writer puts
excessive devotion to a fixed exchange rate in a highly inflationary economy. I
myself accepted at a certain point the argument put by Jeffrey Sachs that under
near-hyper inflationary conditions stability of the exchange rate has a positive
psychological impact on economic agents (a reflection of this argument could be
found in Beksiak et al. [1989]). But there is a sea of difference between main-
taining a fixed exchange rate for a few months at the start of the stabilisation
programme and keeping a fixed exchange rate for the whole year in the face of a
more than three times higher CPI (and almost three times higher quasi-WPI).
Unfortunately, devotion to fixed exchange rates is shared by influential inter-
national institutions, such as the IMF, that support fixed exchange rates as a part
of the adjustment package. But again, knowledge of local conditions is worthwhile
as it helps to avoid pitfalls that undermine the impact of the package.
A fixed exchange rate in the case of a temporarily disequilibrated Western
market economy may pressure domestic producers not to rise prices under the
threat of cheaper imports. A fixed exchange rate is indeed anti-inflationary.
However, this works reasonably well in the short run and with inflation rates in
the range of, say 5-15 per cent on an annual basis. Since March 1990 inflation
rates in Poland on a monthly basis fluctuated on the average between 3 and 5 per
cent with large monthly fluctuations. Maintaining a fixed exchange rate from Jan-
uary 1990 till May 1991 under such circumstances (in the face of quadrupling
prices) undermined the competitiveness of Polish enterprises instead of improving
it. For it is necessary to inject competition to what has otherwise been a highly
concentrated economy. But at the same time few enterprises, whether SOEs or
privately owned, can succeed in reducing their costs by more than 60 per cent
within a year (this was the percentage by which the dollar's value fell in zloty
terms).24
A good saying the present writer once read is worth repeating here: "Not
every kick in the pants galvanises; some merely hurt". An overdose of the medi-
cine has had perverse effects as the bulk of industrial enterprises have been
threatened with bankruptcy. Once again ignorance of differences in local conditions
in applying standard policy measures resulted in perverse effects. The injury is
all the greater for this author stressed in the preceding section that it is the
better not the worse SOEs that have been more adversely affected by monetary
policy.
An obvious conclusion is that a fixed exchange rate regime should have been
changed into a flexible exchange rate regime months ago or, at the very least,
given the dominant Keynesian philosophy of the government's macroeconomic team,
that the fixed exchange rate should have been smoothly adjusted in the face of the
rapidly changing domestic price level. This theoretically sound rationale is, how-
ever, overwhelmed by very difficult technical problems of such an adjustment. The
answer to the question as to when and by how much the exchange rate should
have been changed is extremely difficult in the face of the distorted prices until
1990.
Nonetheless, some benchmarks could be established. The government devalued
the zloty substantially on January 1, 1990, in expectation of a rapid price increase
after the liberalisation of domestic prices. Devaluation in real terms was even
larger than the nominal one by about 30 per cent (as suggested by still greater
differences in a "guesstimated" purchasing power parity in traded goods). That
gave the government room for maintaining a fixed exchange rate for some time.
Erosion of competitiveness became very strong at a certain point, though.
I think that a reasonable benchmark for managing the exchange rate could be
established by reference to changes in domestic prices relative to black market
(and later gray market) exchange rates in the past and the official rate in 1990
and 1991. These changes were markedly uncorrelated because the foreign exchange
market rationally adjusted its expectations of future inflation more quickly (and
acted upon it by devaluing the zloty) than either the government with respect to
centrally set prices or SOEs with respect to decentralised prices. As the reference
time frame I suggest 1988, that is the last year that witnessed on export surge
before transition. Substantial devaluation in late 1987 resulted in a large increase
in convertible currency exports in 1988 (by 17.4 per cent in current US$). Re-
gardless of a choice of benchmark, some benchmark should have existed for a
smooth adjustment of the exchange rate.
Delayed exchange rate adjustment also helps to explain missing benefits of the
second phase of the opening-up of the Polish economy. International trade text-25
books stress two-phased benefits. First, as selling abroad becomes more (or at
all!) profitable, firms shift a larger part of their output abroad. A second - and
more important - phase comes when greater profitability entices existing firms in
the export sector to invest in order to increase their export capacity and new
firms to shift resources to the export sector. However, a shift of recources is
rarely based on firms' own resources only and the second credit squeeze since the
autumn of 1990 strongly discouraged investment. On top of it, profitability of
export orientation has been declining fast with the exchange rate unchanged and
domestic inflation increasing by 3-5 per cent on a monthly basis. Doubly discour-
aged, the export shift petered out toward the end of 1990 and did not register
marked recovery until now (in spite of a further dramatic fall in domestic demand
and an increased pressure to export).
Lastly, it is impossible to make an overview of macroeconomic policy in the
period under consideration without mentioning another stone around its neck, that
is wage controls. I have criticised so many times this particularly harmful measure
in the context of the Polish transition programme [see, e.g., Beksiak et al., 1989;
Beksiak, Winiecki, 1990; Winiecki, 1990a; 1990b] that I feel absolved from taking
up the subject thoroughly once again. Therefore only some aspects of the problem
will be mentioned here. First of all, and this ceterum censeo should be repeated
every time, wage controls shift the conflict from micro (enterprise) to macro
(government) level, leading to unnecessary politicisation of wage claims. The harm
done in the longer run heavily outweighs benefits of such a policy in the short
run (if there are any, as maintained by Bruno [1990], Dornbusch and Simonsen
[1987], and others).
In the particular time and place of the Polish transition between mid-1990 and
mid-1991, the government instead of abandoning wage controls chose the worst
possible way, that of manipulating the rules established earlier by itself. Worse
still, under strike pressure it did not abandon wage controls but reduced their
impact by case-by-case concessions. Since concessions were usually given not to
the most efficient but to the numerically and politically strongest, these conces-
sions brought about no efficiency gains (the opposite in fact has been the case).
Furthermore, the credibility of wage controls was seriously undermined, thus
inviting more and more strike pressure.26
V. Credibility of Economic Poiicy: A Missing Factor in Government's
Considerations
Since the late 1970s one of the hottest topics in economic theory has been the
credibility of government economic policy. Concern with credibility stemmed from
the fact that apparently reasonable policies did not bring about the expected
effects (or even resulted in perverse ones) when government's policies were re-
garded by economic agents as not credible. Some theorists stressed time inconsis-
tency of policies and their perception as being inconsistent by economic agents
[see Kydland, Prescott, 1977], some others analysed conditions that led economic
agents to believe that policy-makers abandoned interventionist stance in favour of
a stable rule (see Barro and Gordon [ 1983] and, in a slightly different context,
Neumann [1990]). Still others explained the persistence of intervention by under-
lining benefits to policy-makers stemming from intentional ambiguity in the face of
informational asymmetry with respect to policy-makers' intentions between policy-
makers and the public [see Cukierman, 1986; Cukierman, Meltzer, 1986]. The
foregoing did not exhaust all strands of thinking about the credibility issue (see,
e.g., contractarians' works with respect to uncertainty reduction through rules on
policy-making).
Whatever the achievements of various strands of economic theory, unfortu-
nately none of these was taken into account in economic policy-making by the
Polish government in the transition period. Analysing its macroeconomic policies,
one gets the impression that policy-makers mistook political support for the gov-
ernment for credibility of particular policies. Regarding political support for the
government as high, they apparently did not think it worthwile to tailor particular
policies with the credibility in mind. No positive reinforcements for particular
policies have been gained from policy design as a result.
Unfortunately, general support for the government of a given political colour-
ing does not mean that the behaviour of economic agents with respect to a partic-
ular policy will be in concordance with policy-makers' expectations if a particular
policy does not look credible. Monetary policy in 1990 serves as a good example
here. The transition programme started with an announced restrictive macroeco-
nomic policy stance. On the surface, words were followed by deeds: the interest
rate, for example, was raised very sharply on December 31, 1989, to 36 per cent
for the month of January 1990. But in reality signals were mixed at best.
As I stressed in the second section, government was announcing the need for
a restrictive macroeconomic policy months in advance but at the same time did very27
little to stop the inflow of cheap money and real resources to SOEs before the "big
bang". Real interest rates remained strongly negative from September till Decem-
ber, cheap imports continued to flow in, fueled by an undervalued exchange rate
till the last days of 1989. Judging by the most recent past, enterprises might have
been partly justified in their expectations that the restrictiveness is a temporary
phenomenon and things will be "back to normal" (in fact: abnormal) soon. Even
after the beginning of the transition programme the government that abolished
export earnings retention quotas did not in any way neutralise the money that
SOEs later converted into zlotys and used as a cash balance support in the early
months of 1990. Thus, signals continued to be mixed and supported the natural
unwillingness to adjust. A wait-and-see or minimum adjustment attitude on the side
of most SOEs was not completely unjustified.
Mixed signals that undermined the credibility of macroeconomic restraint could
have ended in the second half of 1990 as sources of financial support for enter-
prises (cheap inputs from the past, foreign exchange earnings converted into
zlotys) began drying up. Credibility of the government's commitment to restrictive
macroeconomic policy might have increased as a result. However, the government
shifted to a more accommodative policy at about the same time (summer 1990). As a
consequence, SOEs got a strong signal that things might be, after all, moving
"back to normal"; this was obviously not true but such were the credibility-related
consequences of the policy change at this particular moment. And, let it be noted,
the confusion resulting from the difference between government words and govern-
ment deeds in the summer and autumn of 1990 (see the first section) did not add
to the credibility of macroeconomic policy, either.
In some cases policy-makers themselves directly contributed to undermining
the credibility of their own policies. Again, monetary policy is illustrative here. A
look at the term structure of interest rates (see Table 6) reveals that the policy-
makers themselves do not believe in the success of their attempts to eradicate
inflation. Time deposits in commercial banks for varying periods from one month to
two years carry interest rates indicating strong expectations of accelerating in-
flation in the coming years.
Table 6 points to the fact that not only commercial banks expect inflation to
be higher the longer the time span (because time deposits carry higher interest
rates for three months than for one month, for six months than for three months,
etc., with the highest interest rate for two years), but the spread was increasing
throughout October 1990-April 1991. This term structure did not come from no-
where. It is dictated primarily by the interest rate paid to commercial banks for28
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their deposits in the central bank. In this manner the central bank undermines the
credibility of its own policy.
This is not the end of credibility-undermining policy actions made by policy-
makers. The exchange rate policy is not free from such problems, either. The
increasing divergence between the stability of the exchange rate and the rapid
inflation rate caused a lot of speculation about the imminent devaluation of the
zloty. Firm denials to the contrary, reality had to reassert itself at a certain
point. But immediately after devaluing the zloty in May by 16 per cent policy-
makers again began their earlier declarations about defending the new parity of
the zloty. Obviously, their pronouncements will carry much lesser weight in the
future, and all the more so, as the zloty is still perceived to be overvalued.
Overall, mixed signals and resultant low credibility of macroeconomic policy
was in itself a factor reinforcing weak adjustment. But macroeconomic policy was
not the only area where credibility did not positively reinforce government policy
(to say the least).
Trade with the Soviet Union was another example, although more one of
ommission than commission. As exports to the USSR (and other ex-COMECON
countries) collapsed after the shift to convertible currency trade, various ideas of
temporary support were floated in government circles. To the best of my knowl-
edge, however, none of the proposed schemes had the credibility reinforcing
mechanism built into a scheme. The whole idea of temporary support is based on
the premise that SOEs dependent on the Soviet market should have the time neces-
sary for adjustment to the new and more demanding conditions of convertible29
currency trade. Therefore, whatever the scheme, it should have a declining de-
gree of support built into it from the start.
Assuming, for example, support through tax relief for SOEs which exported,
say, more than 30 per cent of their output eastward, tax relief extended over
some 18 months should give full percentage of planned relief for the first 6
months, two third of the tax relief for the next 6 months and only one third for
the last 6 months of the scheme. In this manner, even if the first 6 months were
wasted without any adjustment whatsoever, the reduction of tax relief would serve
as a signal that the government is serious about adjustment. The credibility of this
particular policy would be enhanced and, consequently, prospects for adjustment
would improve.
Credibility may be equated with a stock that, just as any other, may increase
or decrease as a result of policies pursued. Increases or decreases take place at a
rate that is somehow related to the delay between policy pronouncements and actual
policy actions. The smaller the delay, the more the stock increases, and vice
versa. In the case of governments of long standing or political groupings
returning to power with a certain record of past policy-making, there may be quite
a substantial stock of credibility and one or two slip-ups will not draw down the
stock too heavily. But this is not true of a new government, no matter how
strongly supported on a general political plane. Regardless of strong general
support, a few credibility-reducing mistakes may draw a given policy's credibility
down sharply, as the stock of credibility from which to draw is not large. More-
over, whatever credibility has been there, it was given on (easily callable) credit.
Polish government policies have been strongly - and adversely - affected by the
lack of understanding of the problem in question.
VI. In Place of Conclusions
The present writer began his assessment with the reference to an earlier one
concerning the first half of 1990 [ Winiecki, 1990a]. Prospects for success were at
that time rather high although I was cautioning against easy optimism and criti-
cised the privatisation-cum-demonopolisation part of the programme [ see Winiecki,
1990a; Beksiak, Winiecki, 1990]. The year that passed between mid-1990 and
mid-1991 changed the prospects markedly. Accumulating policy errors, as well as
perverse results of some pursued policies, undermined prospects for success in the
short run.30
Inflation did not subside, while the economy slid into a second recession in
just so many years. Worse still, the structure of output has got progressively
worse as better enterprises have been facing bankruptcy much more often than
politically strong but economically less efficient ones. Supported by advice based
on ignorance of the STE legacy, the government's macroeconomic team keeps an
unchanged course that may result in a bankruptcy threat for a large share of
SOEs.
Now, if it is dozens of SOEs that simultaneously go bankrupt, government
way weather the storm somehow. The situation changes dramatically if numbers
increase from dozens to hundreds (or more). Faced by the looming collapse of a
large share of industry, government may give in to the pressure for relief. How-
ever, under the weight of large numbers relief cannot be anything else than
wholesale. As every enterprise gets relief because large numbers overwhelm gov-
ernment's and everybody else's ability to differentiate between classes of more and
less deserving SOEs (see second section of the paper), the effort and sacrifice of
the preceding 18 months may largely be lost. The stabilisation programme will have
to start again and with much less credibility than the failed programme of 1990-
1991 (as well as with much lower willingness to continued belt-tightening).
But the prospect of the failed stabilisation programme and the need for a
second round of stabilisation medicine may not necessarily be the end of the dismal
story. Not only the government but also the idea of a rapid transition to the
market system may become discredited in the process and an election may bring
victory to some populist, "third way" type of coalition that will radically change
the direction of transition. If this were to happen, prospects for success would
disappear in the medium run as well. Years may have to pass before another, this
time hopefully more sensibly executed programme aiming at the same target, i. e. a
capitalist market economy, will become a political reality.31
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